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INTERSECTION: Since the weekend, monitored Soviet and Satellite radio broadcasts have carried relatively little about the imminent CFM meeting. A Warsaw commentary pursues the previously established Soviet line that the "diplomatic moves of the Soviet Union forced the Western Powers to withdraw from their position and to admit the failure of their tactical methods, including the famous airlift."

re stive CERNAL "WELTT" AND THE CERNAL PROPLE'S CONCRESS ELECTIONS: The issue of German "unity" receives continued attention in broadcasts from both Moscow and the Soviet-controlled German radios. Moscow, however, has not yet commented on the presumably unexpected results of the Soviet-Zone German People's Congress elections. And although some Soviet-controlled German sources speak of the elections as "an unambiguous victory of the democratic forces in the Soviet Zone, they also rail against the "dangerous double-dealers in the democratic camp" who "camouflage their policy of double-crossing" by "pretending to support the People's Congress movement for unity and a just peace." According to Walter Ulbricht, a People's Congress leader, "the task from now on is to win over most of the voters who said 'no' to the fightfor German unity." The Born Constitution and the West-Berlin "occupation statute" are subject to familiar attacks; they are said to be obvious attempts "to face the Paris Conference with accomplished disruptive measures.

OTHER POSSIBLE INSUES AT THE CFM COMPENSATE: Possible Conference issues other than German "unity" receive only peripheral attention. A Soviet broadcast review of Moscow's PRAVDA includes an implicitly approving report of a statement attributed to General Clay. He is said to have teld journalists "that measures for the lifting of transport restrictions are a proof of good will on both sides," and "that he personally considers Soviet participation in an international control over the Ruhr to be remountable if corresponding guarantees will be supplied. The Prague radio, commenting on the approaching CFM Conference, contrasts the Seviet policy of German demilitarization and democratization with the alleged Western policy of reviving German nationalism and militarism. ive

COMPERENCE PROSPECTS: Few allusions are made to the possible outcome of the CFM Conference.

The above mentioned broadcast of a PRATIM article makes an invidious reference to preliminary Anglo-U.S.-French talks in Paris "behing the backs of the Soviet delegation." A Prague newspaper is reported by the Soviet-controlled Garman press service to have raised the prespect of possible discord between French policy and Anglo-U.S. policy; the French authorities concerned with the Conference are said to be reversibly trying to find answers for all possibilities with which the British and Americans might surprise France." Moscow and the Soviet-controlled German redice also continue to interpret "the extraordinary haste with which the Bonn Constitution has been adopted as a move that clearly follows specific political aims, as an attempt to present the CHASSIFICATION of the CHASSIFICATI

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The Soviet-centralied German radies have also mounted a campaign to broaden the Soviet Zone's "strongtheadd Semecratic Front" into a "Sational Front which sets itself the task to fight for the unity of Germany and its national independence... "The "no" votors" in the recent elections, as well as the people in Western Germany, must be convinced that "the German people can live in peace only if it can obtain a peace treaty and national unity as quickly as possible." To this end, the "German problem" is defined "not as a question of power of a party, a creed, or an ideology" but as a "question of a national German existence (which) is the concern of all Germans... "The propaganda target is said to be "all nationally winded Germans"—including "businessmen, "untrepreneurs," and "merchants." "It is necessary to realize and understand," says SED leader Walter Ulbricht, "that in Germany there are many people the are not yet democrate, but who sincerely wish for a peaceful development and the unity of Germany." But "of course, the policy of the National Front will not mean remouncing the arti-faggist democratic order as created in the Eastern Zone."

grate Issues Stitutes: Although one Soviet-controlled German commentator claims that the "main agends" of the CM Conference will include the questions of (1) German unification, (2) the peace treaty, and (3) the withdrawal of occupation troops, the substance of the latter two issues is not elaborated. The only positive contribution that monitored Moscow broadcasts have made in this respect is contained in a NEW TIMES article reiterating the necessity for observing the Yalta and Potsdam agreements:

"Were the firm foundations of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements to be retained, a solution of the German problem could be brought about in the interests of the Four-Powers and of the German people."

A negative Soviet contribution appears in the 19 May TASS statement that reports of Amelo-Soviet-W.S. talks "on including the Greek problem in the agenda" of the CFM Conference do "not correspond to the facts."

Some ranges Temphs To CREATE AN "NUMBER PARKETS IN A SPECIAL SECURISE: In general, Soviet and Satellite radios hasard few speculations about the Conference outcome. It is implied that success will be achieved if the Four Powers adhere to Yalta and Potedan—and if "the bankrupt methods of distation and attempts to force one's will on the partner" are eliminated. In the other side of the ledger, however, NEW TIMES indicates the following attempts by the "archemenies of collaboration" to create an unfavorable atmosphere through their press: "the provocative demands... to adopt a forceful attitude towards the Soviet Union; and the demands to bury the Potedan and other agreements." "Equally suspicious," says NEW TIMES, repeating a previously expressed theme, is the "feverish haste" in which the Bonn Constitution was adopted. A Soviet-controlled Berlin transmission views with "distrust" the preliminary Anglo-U.S.-French talks "about the tactics to be applied vis-a-vis the USSR." And a Soviet-controlled Austrian broadcast says that British anti-Satellite propagands in Austria "makes one legitimately doubt the Vestern Powers' sincere wish to come to an understanding."

[&]quot;The explanations for these "se" wise raise all the very from claims that voters "gisconstruct" the elections significance and pure rent to "certain dissatisfactions, such as high prices," Grouph charges of "double-dealing," to attacks on the "uncorapulous (Vestern propagates) comparing of distortion and slander." se Reporting the "actual facts," however, TASS cites Soviet willingness to participate in "stopping the civil war."